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INTRODUCTION
LCWE
WANT NEITHER TO LEAD A MISERABLE
LIFE ANY LONGER, NOR TO BE DRAGGED .
INTO ANOTHER WAR."
,

d

Thew words were spbken at a Japanese people's peace congress
in Tokyo last December. Our generals and diplomats would prefer
to M k v e that such a , protest comes only from Communist "agit~brs," trying to spoil American ''plans for -building Japan into a
bdwark against Communism i6 Asia. Whether they themselves . 5;
believe it or not2 the generals, and diplomats would ha*e it believedr9rr-;,%
ff*K$
by, as many Americans as possible. For if it is not t r u e i f , instead,&
,
'

dragged into ano~herwar.'' This statement rejects two dreadful alternatives with which American policy has confronted Japan. Lest there
be any doubt about those alternatives; U.S.Senator Willlam Know-

alternative must include casting off American interference. Effo
to disldge that' interference, in Japan as elsewhere in the worl
will continue to be characterized by our diplomats ansE journalists
as a "hate-America" campaign based on malicious falsehtmd or, at
best, "misunderstanding of our motives." But this may prove to
a shallow interpretation; as citizens, we need to lmk &neath to

I

I. LLWe
W W Not Be Dragged Into Another War"
The painfully blistered fishermen and the contaminated tuna
that came home to Japan in March, after the American hydrogen
explosion in the Pacific, was written off here as an unfortunate accident: Our scientists miscalculated. If we feel deeply the horror of our
newest weapons, and of war itself, we must expect and understand
the answering explosion of protest from the Japanese, that twiceburned people. It is not just because we insist on carrying on our
demolition practice in somebody else's back yard. Japanese involvement in American war preparations has a much more direct effect
on the lives and livelihood of the Japanese than any contaminated
dust blown in from Eniwetok.
The most obvious factor is the presence of American military
forces and their elaborate, far-flung installations in Japan. After
Japan's defeat in World War I1 their presence was supposed to
symbolize American surveillance against a resurgence of Japanese
arined imperialism. But the-presence of American troops in Japan
today means something else again. Ostensibly defending the country,
it continually threatens to involve Japw in somebody else's war;
under the less palatable guise of defending American interests in the
Far East, it binds Japan to the side of Syngman Rhee, Chiang Kaishek and Bao Dai. This very physical presence of foreign troops
makes itself felt in a hundred ways. Here are some illuminating
episodes from the annals of the past year:
Because of heavy troop losses in the mountains of Korea, the
united States Army looked for a mountainous area in'-Japan to use
as a maneuvering ground. They chose the Myogi Mountain area
in Gunma Prefecture. The inhabitants of the area protested immediately; in June 1953 a "compromise" meeting was held, the results of which were so unsatisfactory that the Japanese workers
and peasants walked out en masse. Six months later the battle was
still on. U.S. Army maneuvers had been twice postponed because
the people of the prefecture would not permit the troops yo enter?
Asamayama District, a volcanic region 140 kilometers northwest
of Tokyo, was also chosen as a U.S. maneuvering ground. In this
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case distinguished Japanese scientists joined in the protests. - That
particular area has S e n in use by the Seismological Research Institute of Tokyo for some twenty years for the study of earthquakes,
a form of natural disaster in which Japan has an intense interest.?.
Last summer *US. military forces leased a strech of sand dunes
near Uchinada, a fishing port on the Sea of fapan, as a testing
ground for muniuons made by Japanese manufacturers. It meant
that off-shore fishing would be prohibited near Uchinada, a village
of 7,000 kople, and that the thunder of artillery would become a
daily phenomenon. Tourist tr&c would also be affected. Uch'iada
became a national issue. The assembly of the prefecture voted unanimously against the permanent use of the area as a firihg range.
A thousand residents of Uchinada staged a sit-down strike; they dustered just outside the fenced-in: area, while another thousand demonstrated in the streets. That day the US. forces had to use only shortrange ammunition. Two weeks later hundreds of villagers clashed
with 300 armed Japanese police in another demonstration against
the firing rangem4
Early in 1952it was estimated5that U.S. military requisitioning of
land had passed the 70,000-acre mark; another estimate a year latera
gave the number of U.S.bases as 735, and the amount of land covered
by these bases and used by U.S. miiltary forces as over 250,000 acres. '
, When a population half as big as that of the United States is squeezed
into an area the size of California, as it is in the case of Japan, ,the
land in itself has 'some importance. But what cannot be. measured
in acres is the .disruption of economic life, as in the case of the fishing
around Uchinada, and equally important the disruption of cultural

-

lifer

Tim and again the protests voiced by the Japanese people indude refetences to.the disruptive influence of "GI culture" in wide
areas surrounding American military installations in Japan. It would
be a mistake to blame this entirely on criminal acts 'of individual
soldiers. Guided by the traditional attitudes -of our federal, state,
and local governments, a laige segment of o u r soldiery goes abroad
imbued with the idea that non-white people are inferior, and they behave that way. Adding insult to injury, the troops bring with thim
- .
what is usually considered the scum of American culture--taxi-dance
halls, steptease, pin-ball' machines, ace7

,
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The old, sore question with all Asians of extraierritdrial rights
,j
w v revived during the' U.S. Occupation, when American personnel
were held not liable to fapawe laws and Japanese courts. Even today, with the Occupation officially over, their liability remains in- '
complete. .
:
When Asahi, one of JApan's largest and most conservative daily
"Should United States troops
newspapers, took a poll on the
continue. in Japan?" 16 per cent of the Jwnese people polled re-fused to express an opinion; 27 per cent said yes; and the largest
group, 47 per cent, said noO8
Peasants and villagers hkve not been alone in their protests against
the presence of foeign troops. Japan's trade unions take an active
.,part, for in &any instances their livelihoods are affected as dirdtly .
as t b of ~the ~ c h h a d afishermen. T h e General Council of Trade
Upions, - commonly .known as SOHYO, has a membership of 3,ooo,oqo and is b e largest labor federation in Japan. Its 1953 conw t i o n took a strong stand against US.military bases. Army labor
policies were likewise protested. Workers employed by the Japanese
gQvermnent to work for the American forces carried out an unprece- .
d&d
@-hour strike last Auguste9 Involved were some g5,ood
ryxnbers of the National Federation.of Security ~ o r c e Workers
i
and
%~6,ooo
of the All-Japan Security Forces Workers. They demanded
more job security, better grievance &hinery, and iinproved working
conditions. They protested "the impotency of the reactionary Japanese
the arbitrary behavior of the U.S. Armed Fotces
and
, authorities.''
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The sheer physical resistance of the Japanese people to the presence
and.activities of American troops in their oountry m a y well be one
reason why our government is trying desperady to expand Japanese
military foras: If the lapanese people were eagm $0 build jkdr w n
militmy rtreng~hin place of American troops,. this "anti-AmeAcanism" might be takCn at fa;e value. But when we analyze the news
of the period sin@ Japan regained her sovereignty, we discover instead a powerful vein of feeling against any kind o f re#zmamtnt."Anti-Americanism" a r k s , not from a hatred of the American people
and all things A m e r i q , but.because it is die United States govern4

:

ment, working with the largest industrial interests and the leaders
of the most reactionary political parties, which is pushing for Japanese rearmament.
It is vitally impoftant for us to trace the sources of the drive for
pcace and, the drive for war in Japan today.
In June 1953 Takutaro Kimura, chief of Japan's National Safety
Agency bnd a member of Premier Shigeru Yoshida's cabinet, sent
up a trial balloon: He disclosed the rearmament proposals of a
group of, Japanese government officials and businessmen: by 1958,
zoo,ooo men in the National Safety Corps, a body called "armylike'' by the New York Timer; 150,ooo tons bf "coastal patrol"
. vesselt+including 'five aircraft carriers; an air force of ,r,soo military planes, half of them jets. So violent was the Japimese reaction
that even. some members of Yoshida's own'
to this trial- Exali~~n
party called for Kimura's ouster from the government.1°
This is 'only one of a number of recent episodes pointing up .the
sharp conflict between peace forces and war forces in Japan. Poiitical.party strength is only part of the story. The two chief prwearmament parties, ironically named the Liberal, and Progressive partics, have been in the saddle of government almost uninterruptedly
since the end of the war. Facing this parliamentary stronghold a-re
large numbers of "independents," the rel-atively large right-wing and
left-wing Socialist parties, and the smaller Communist Pasty. Taken
statistidy, the fluctuating success of the opposition parties in terms
of Diet seats does not fully reflect the power of Japanese aati-rearmament keling; this is made obvious by the desperate chiwying
required of American politicians in order to make Yoshida go more
quickly down the road to total rearmament.
Jap;ui's "Gift Constitution" of 1947, socalled because it was born
in' American Occupation headquarters and presented to the Japanese
people, included a famous renunciation-of-war clause which has, not
yet been officially repealed. The Japanese Peace Treaty dictated ,in
1951 by John Foster Dulles not only to Japan herself but to the
other nations which had fought against Japan, did'not make adherence to the 1947 Constitution compulsory. When asked why it did not,
Dulles explained in noble phrases-that such adherence could not
be cokpelled from the outside; to compel it would be to nullify
Japan's sovereignty.ll Yet while Premier Yoshida was attempting
'

,

,

to calm his critics by assuring them that no military build-up for
Japan' was planned, Mr. Dulles, as the new U.S. Secretary of .State,
announced to the Senate Appropriations Committee that Japanese
"defense" forces would be increased to 10 divisions (350,000 m&).
The fresh outcry' from the Japanese people and even from many
Japanese political leaders forced Dulles to hedge. This was only an
ultimate goal, he said. "However, all decisions with respect to their
National Safety Force, and especially with respect to any increase in
it, will, of cobrse, be made by +e Japanese government and people
through their governmental process." Then he added with curious
cynicism, "Once their decisions have been made, whatever they may
be, we are prepared to help equip these forces."12
This was in July 1953, only three months after h e general Japanese elections in April. Of these elections, William J. Jorden of the
New-York Times" observed that the results were "regarded as a
repudiation of any immediate large-scale rearmament by Tapan.
The parties that suffered the largest loss of strength were the Progressives and the followers of Mr. Hatoyama [a splinter group from
Yoshida's Liberal Party], who openly supported a revived Japanese
army."
. The Asahi opinion poll mentioned above, taken in June 1953, inquired whether it was. wise to comply with the American requests
for an expanded National ~ d e t yCorps, thereby making Japan eligible
for more weapons aid as Dulles was promising. 33 per cent expressed no opinion, 27 per cent said yes, and the largest group, 40
per cent, said no. A similar response was evoked by the question
whether Japan should get Mutual Security aid from the United States.
In the face of this surge of anti-rearmament feeling, it is small
wonder that 'the Yoshida government hesitated for many more
months, until March of this year, before taking one of the steps demanded by the United States. The Japanese Foreign Minister hastily
assured an angry Diet, after Dulles' remarks on the National Wety
Corps, that Japan could not constitutionally accept military aid from
the United States: But the pressure from American officials and from
Japanese big business was unremitting.

...
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U.S. Exerts Pressure
A large American liews magazine1* complained that Japanese
officers no lo&er have the moral incentive. to die f a the Emperor;
6
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"people who deeply respected the old Imperial Army scorn members
of the Safety Force as American mercenaries." It added: "The
difficulties in expanding the army and imbuing it with good morale
partly stem from the fact that the Japanese learned the lessons of the
last war too well and took the precepts of the occupation too seriously." American newspaper editorials tobk the whole Japanese nation to task for failing to comply with American interests. Senator Knowland went to Japan and made his threat.
When Dulles himself went to Japan last August he indulged in
some rather cynical horse-trading. He announced that the United
States had decided to give back to Japan a group of ten little islands,
the Amami Islands, off Kyushu, with a population of 213,000. This
gift was "generally regarded as an attempt to relieve the opposition
in Japan to the American occupation."15 But the Amami Islands
agreement as actually signed last December provided that the United
States can keep up its military installations in the 'islands and can
even increase them.16 The New York Times remarked in passing17
that the inhabitants of the Amamis have been going on periodic hunger strikes a g a i ~ the
t Arnerican forces for ears! This was quite a
gift.
There was internal as well as external pressure for rearmament.
Speaking of "the elaborate program already completed by the industrialists of the leading [Japanese] economic organizations for
rebuilding Japin's once powerful arms industry and strengthening
, her armed forces," the New York Times stated:IO"Japanese arms and
ammunition makers regard the conclusion of a military assistance
agreement with the United States as a necessary requirement for
the revival of their industry." Within two weeks after the Korean
war began, the Japanese government had offered non-military aid
to the U.N. forces; happily for Japan's industrialists and her seriously
sagging economy, this offer brought in U.S. procurement orders to
the amount of $100 million in the first three months alone. The
Korean truce had now reduced this important source of income and
threatened to reduce it further. Only the rearming of Japan, and
the employment of Japan by the United States as an armaments
workshop, could save the munitions makers.
These. combined pressures have had some effect. At the close
of 1953 a "Constitutional Research Committeeyywas set up by Yosh-

ida's Liberal Party, to work for.the &peal of the renunciation-of-war
;lause?@ - Lindsay Parrott reported? "The conservative government, while slowly rearming Japan, has proved extremely reluaant
to risk a referendum on a constitutional amendment to' permit
maiptenance of an armed force because of widespread Japanese fears
that .a new military caste would thus be created." The repeal of the
~huse,if it comes, will be only a formality. In March 1954 the
japanese government ~igneda mutual-aid pact with the United
States, while Ydida's cabinet approved two idraft bills for a "selfdcfense"'brce to enable Japan to k r y out the terms of the pact?'
The green light has h given for the building o f Japanese warsbps and other types of a r ~ ~ u n c n tThe
.
Toyo Aircraft Company
had reportedly been engaged for months, with the aid of an American hI
in:making bombers for the French puppet army of Bao
1Crsli' in Ind~-China?~
Sine the-Indo-China truce at Geneva this rerainkg prop to the Japanese economy has also been removed.

To continue on this course .in the teeth of Japanese popular opposition requires systematic repression of criticism and protest. If
Japanese r d o n a r i e s had not had behind them ,a long tradition
in the art of repressing protest, they could still have learned a lesson
from b e repressive tactics exercised by .the U.S.Occupation after the
first few months of "democratic refonn." After pointing with pride
to
organized labor movement and the women's and peasants'
organizations that sprang up in Japan after 1945, Ger~eralMaeArthur
quickly realized that these workers and peasants were taking too
seriously their new power and responsibility as citizens of Japan.
'General strikes were banned in 1947, at the behest of the Occupation,
and govirnment workers lost their new-won power of collective bar*gaining. Yoshida's group has . continued and ,enhanced the= re1
pressive policies.
Under government prodding and. by selective firing, leftists were
driven out of union and pasant' organizations. Leftist leaders were
arrested under obsolete laws. Communist offices were raided and
their publications banned. In onefcase23 the distributor of a leftist
publication was arrested and tried under a law providing. punishment for criticizing the U.S Occupation; when Ta~anregained its

,
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sovereignty ib 1952 ;he law had been dropped from the criminal
code, but the Japanese courts were still using it. When workers at
U.S. Army Unit 229 in Yokohama mentioned increased produ&on
in asking for a wage increase, they were charged with disclosing
military secrets.24
The "Matsukawa Incident," famous not only in Japan but in
labor movements throughout the world, began when 23 union leaders
were charged, on questionable evidence, with derailing a train.
During four years of imprisonment the defendants were tried numerous times in the lower and higher courts. Gseat protest demonstrations were held in their behaif. When the appeal decision was
handed down at the close of last yyr, U.S. military police were reported to have swarmed around the courthouse. Four of the union- ists were sentenced to death, four to life imprisonkent, and all but
three of the others to lesser terms in prisonT6.
Premier Yoshida's Minister of Education has stated' that one of
his major -tasks is to destroy the Japanese Teachers Union, 'with
500,oob members. In January of this iear, this union called its third
Educational Research Conference; Shigeru Nambara, former president
of Tokyo University, condemned Yoshida's attempt to revive militarist education as an .annex to Japan's rearmament. "Peace, -not
militarism, is the only way to guarantee Japan's security," he declared.
. Resolutions were adopted to fight f o pea&
~
and to oppose ''thought
control'" bills.26
On February 12, 1954, 'Yoshida's cabinet discussed two measures:
one which would make it illegal for public school teachers to engage
in any kind of-political activity, and one to prohibit any organization
largely composed of teacherssfrom instigating educators to take political action. Protest meetings .against these measures were promptly
held throughout the country. Even Japan's major newspapers
unanimously attacked the bills. Conservative Asahi said that the bills
revealed the government's intention of "making the nation's education serviceable to the state and centralizing it under unified control";
Mainichi, another large conservative newspaper, said that the "twisted
interpretation of the laws could piace the nation's education system
mder police control."27
sharpening attacks like these on freedom of the press, speech,
how that reaction is sitting only shakily in Japan's
&-"cr
9.

'
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parliamentary saddle. Strohg-arm tactics are 'required against the
drive for peqce, and not the least of these is the agrekment with the
United States that American armed forces remaining in Japan may
be used to put down large scale riots and disturbances in Japan.
,
Yet such repressive measures have not had the desired success. .
Even the Communist Party, according to New~week?~
has made a
"resounding" comeback since its low poiat of 60,ooo members in
1951. Its "New Program," brought forward at the end of 1951,
describes Japan's present position as that of a colonial country under
the domination ,of the United States, and calls for a national coalition of most Japanese economic and political groupings except those
politicians and businessmen who profit from co11aboration with
American businessmen and diplomats. The goals of the proposed
. coalition i n h d e d the shaking off of American influence, the building
of a
economy where civilian industry can flourish, the
settlement
of
agrariah
problems and the reclamation of land now
.
considered not arable. -Aims such as these were bound tp receive in. creasing support.
-Sohyo, the largest trade union federation, was originally created
by the US. occupation in 1950 with the intention of making it a
right-wing organization. The latest effort to unseat the militant
leadership of Japan's, largest, 3,000,ooo-strong labor federation failed
when, in July 1954, the delegates to the National Convention of the
General Council of Japanese Trade Unions re-elected Minoru
Takano to the post of Geoeral Secretary. Mr. Takano has been a relentless fighter for the economic demands of the Japanese workers
as well as an outspoken advocate of the re-establishment of normal
relationdiplomatic and commercial-with the Chinese mainland
and the Soviet Union. He has opposed rearmament and the presence
of U.S. bases in Japan. Today Sohyo is carrying on a vocal and
active struggle for peace asd economic reform; it has been forced to
the struggle by the needs and energies of its own rank and file.
The programs of organizations like Sohyo in Japan today show a
lively awareness of the fact that large political and economic issues
are always closely intertwined. The political battles of these Japanese
workers are bound up with, and in fact stem from, the& economic
needs. In our American labor movement today an attempt has been
made, with some success, to separate the demand for peace from the

1
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demand for porkchops. The connection between the two is even
more clear and pressing. in Japan than it is here today. For the Japanese people the fight against rearmament and against American
domination goes hand in hand with the fight for a decent livelihood.

II., CCWe
Will Not Lead a Miserable Life
Any Longer9'
The magnitude, vigor, and organization of Japanese workers'
demonstrations has increased in spite of heavy-handed government
threats and repression. In the spring of 1952 Japan was about to
regain her sovereignty with a peace treaty promising continued
American domination, and *theYoshida government was preparing
legislation which would make trade unions liable for dissolution
if they opposed government policies. On April 18 of that year over
8oo~oooJapanese union members took part in a general work stop
page protesting not only the anti-labor legislation but also the continuing presence of American troops, and asking for decent wage
le~els.2~
Support for this demonstration came from thousands of
students and other strata of the Japanese population.,
In July 1953 some three million workers carried on a suia of
"lightning"
str&es against a new law banning strikes in public ~ervices.~
Last December nearly a million members of the nine
member unions of the National Council of Public Enterprise Workers left their jobs in demonstrations for yearend bonuses to eke out
their payF1 Sohyo delegates met with government officials and
warned them not to interfere with the demonstrations. Such was the
unity of feeling in the Sohyo federation that any attempt at interference would bring on a general strike.
These are only samplings from a tremendous struggle. ,What
are the basic facts behind this struggle? According to US. News
and World Repa?, an American business magazine, Japanese production had risen by 1952 to 40 per cent above its prewar level,while the standard of living was estimated at 15 per cent below
prewar. Urban people, in fact, were 25-30 per cent poorer than before
the war.a2 It should be recalled that during this period the Korean
war was still creating an artificial boom in Japan.
That industrial boom, created by U.S. p r o c u r k t buying, w
I

II
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very remunerative to Japanese industrialists; it never filtered down to
the bulk of the working people. Before the Korean war the Japanese
livirig standard had recovered to 75 per cent of the 1930-34 level
(a low enough. level to sart with); after the Korean war began,
prices rose-some50 per cent and "the government has shown neither
the ability to cope. with inflation nor the inclination to strengthen the
social security system."^
Official estimates of non-agricultural unemployment for that year
of 1'952, before the boom ended with the Korean truce, ran between
400,000 and 500,000. The Financid Times of London, in its issue of
July 5, 1954, reported that an o&ial survey of unemployment in
Japan between March and May, 1954 was ccmserv&ively estimated
at 4 million or about 11 per cent of the +total labor force of 36.2
m i l . The Tic o ~ e n t that
e ~ "Unemployment now is believed ta be mirch higher. Industrial layoffs and the number of unemployment bendciaries have shown a marked increase.from month
to month."
A 1952 estimate by farm e x p e d 4 stated that the Japanese farming industry could absorb a total of about 13 million farm workers;
yet even during the Korean war, when presumably some firm labor
was siphoned of3 into 0th.e; industries, Japan had 18 million farm
workereconomic surplus of 5 million. To this situation, as far
as farming people are concerned, must be added the inherent dangers
of the American Occupation's land reform- program, under which
govemmkt compensation of landowners for land redistributed gave
than the opportunity to buy back their land under ''dummy" owner-

ships.

The ''austerity drive" now being waged by the Japanese govern&t is openly aimed at reducing non-military spending only; it
stems dearly from the rearmament drive abetted by the US. Part
of this program, dmittcd to the Japanese cabinet by the Administrative Supervision Board at the end of 1953, is a 3-year plan to dismiss ever 110,ooo government workers, of whom 25,000 work for
govemment-owned railways9 Economy was only part of the rnotive; the government also planned to dismiss a number of railroad
union leaders, charging that they led the recent year-end campaign
for wage increases. Instantly responding to this threat, both the
union involved and the newly organized Council of Public Workers
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b i o n s planned ddwdowns .and other measures to C o m b it.- In a further "austerity" move aimed at those who could least afford
it, Premier Yoshida in his draft budget for 1954 called for a cut in' .
unemployment benefit appropriations. This roused a further storm
of protest f r m Japanese workers. The New York Times reportedP
"For the f o d consrmtive day several thousand men from wo
casual laborers unions picketed the Finance Ministry'waving Red
banners and demanding no reduction in funds ht unemployment
relief?.
While social security expenditures were thus to be reduced, militaq
funds in the 1954 draft budget were increased to 163 billion yen,
including 61 billion yen as "oceupitim funds.''88
This emphasis on military spending, and the peculiar exigencies
of b e r i c a n foreign policy have cast the Japanese economy in .a
mold in. which no economy can survive for long. The darnage,
though severest in the workers' livelihood, extends considerably beyond, into the ranks of small and middle-sized business. The woPdsPds
"We will not starve quietly" comrmriously e n o u g h o t from a worker but from an Osaga industrialist, quoted in US. News and
World RepiH9 The two major factors against which both workers
and smaller businesses have to fight in Japan today are these: the.rci '
b i d and continued growth of monopoly, stamping out smaller
competitors in their hundreds; and the American-imposed rcsaictions
on trade with China, which could provide many of the rkw materials
needed by Japan's consumer industries. .
Back in 1948 a conservative Americap economist, a f k a long
and careful study of Japan's postwar economic problems, concluded
that "Basic solutio~sfor Japan can come only with the complete
integration of its economy with &OM* of all other Far Eastern
countries . the longer this economic rapprochement in Asia is delayed, the more costly and the less successful will be United States
darts in Japan a l ~ n e . " ~
A number of Asian countries have bcea hesitant about trading
with ~ a ~ asince
n * the end of World War 11. Japanese trade with
as been patchy because of still undamages. Former victims of Japan's
'
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military and konomic aggression fear the r e b i d of that aggressive
drive; with reason, in view of the rapid rebuilding of Japan's topheavy plonopolistic structure. As former colonial counkies struggle
toward a more -industrial future, however, there is a great net$ in
Asia for Japan's peacetime capital goods and consumer ,goods, while
Japanese business needs many materials which it can secure emnomically only ih other parts f Asia.
neighbor,- China, is her nearest and largest potential
Japan's
source and market. But by American orders Japan's trade with China
has been heavily restricted. Without the China trade, Japan's foreign
trade deficit is kept moderate only by her largely artificial and temprary receipts from U.S. procurement orders, tourism, and spending
by foreign soldiers in Japan. Of the total ~f $800 million in these
"invisible exports" in 195%U.S. special procurement accounted for
$400 million:"
Despite this temporary compensation due to thc
Korea war, the foreign trade deficit over-all had reached $n5
million in 1953, and a deficit of 5200 million was predicted by the
Bank of Japan for 1g54"2 .
Forced by American policy, Japan now buys many items in the
dollar market which she could obtain more econmieally in Asia
($9 a ton foi Chinese coal, for example, as against $32 a ton for
American coal"). On the other hand, the Yoshida governdent has
recently been forced to cut the prices of Japanese export commodities,
so that, according to figures published in Japan's leading financial
daily, Sangyo Keizai Shin~bun,"~
an item like Japanese-manufactured
cotton yarn costs 193 yen per pound outside Japan and 232 yen per
pound inside Japan.
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Japanese United For China Trade

To impose these trade policies on Japan, as our government has
done, ampunts to throttling one's ally to spite one's enemy. The
"throttled" Japanese businessmen can hardly be expected to see eye to
eye with American strategists on this subject. On July 29, 1953,
the lower house of the Japanese Diet unanimously approved a resolution which said in part: "Japanese industry is now groaning amidst
With the signing of the Korean armistice
a deep economic crisis.
agreement, the Japaneie government should act in accordance with thc
wish of the majority of the people and smash the obstacles and pro-
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mote trade with China."45 In October a group of Japanese Diet members and businessmen toured the Chinese People's Republic, their
expenses reportedly paid by their government. Their party a i a t i o n s
ranged all the way from the right-wing Liberal and Progressive par. ties to the Farmer-Labor and Communist parties. The industries they
represented included auto, steel, marine products, shipbuilding, and
textile?6
,
Upon his 'return from China one of these Diet members, a Japanese businessman, was interviewed in some detail by Robert P. Martin, Far Eastern Editor of U.S. News and World R e ~ t ?Diet
~
member Ikeda reported in this interview that tentative contracts had
been signed during his visit for 400,000 tons of Chinese coking cod,
300,000 tons of salt, and other items. He said that the Chinese had
made "great strides," and added: "I think it would help prevint
another war if the United States, instead of remaining hostile, would
have friendly relations with Red China. I hope the Americans will
understand that the Japanese people believe this."
Owners of small and middle-sized businesses in Japan have discovered an area of common interest with the Japanese working
people-not only on the question of trade with China, but also on
the pressing issues of building a stiong peacetime economy unburdened by monopoly. In May 1953 the League of Japanese Medium
and Small Business Organizations, the All Japan Middle and Small
Industries Society, and three other similar organizations made a
joint Etatement protesting the economic policies of the Liberal and
Progressive parties in the administration. These policies, said the
businessmen, were aimed at relaxing the anti-monopoly laws which
now exist on paper and crushing small and medium business through
inequitable taxation.48
These businessmen, along with their far more numerous allies,
the working people of Japan, are daily made aware of the tremendous distortion in the distribution of economic benefits and ecpnomic power in Japan today. According to recent United Nations
figures, Japanese industrial output is growing faster than that of any
other non-Communist country in the world. During the third quarter of 1953 it was 23 per cent higher than in the same quarter of the
preceding year. Yet living standards lag far behind and bankruptcies
continue at an alarming rate.
s

15

.

,

Then what is happening to Japan's national wealth? Is it "leaking
out at the .seams," into the pockpockets of the admittedly noplerous a
suwssful black rnarketeers, and into the financial scandals $at
have rocked the highest levels of lapanese gwemment more than
once since the war? Even large-scale qrruption of this kind
starkly account for the present state of Japan's economy.

,

ZdbatsumWali Street, New Postwar Partaerhip
The conservative newspaper Asahi published lait year the follow, ing figures f&m ' the Japanese ' Revenue Offi~e:'~in 1951, 36 top
corpora&ons in Japan earned a total of about $5.5 million; in 1952,
the saw mount was earned by 15 top corporations. Largest earnin& were rung up by the Bank of Japan, Hitachi Factory, Oji Paper
Wi, Mi:tsui Metal, Mihubishi Electric, Uitsui Mine, Mitsubishi
M+, Yd-ta Steel, Jujo Paper Mill, and Joban Mine. The reader
will recognize at l& some of these firms as belonging to, or as con-
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wUed by, the industrial royal families of Japan-the Zaibatsu. Kt?
At the end of 1953 it was estimated that the old Zaibatsu fami- '
lies now control 45% of Japan's coal, 65% of her shipbuilding,
50% of the ammonium sulphate industry, and 50% of the electrolytic
coppa industryPO The ten companies making the biggest profits
in the first nine months of 1953 were all Zaibatrusontrolled.
The famous Pauleg report on .Japanese reparations, made by a@
American expert commission early in the occupation, declarql that .
the Zaibatsu "are the 'greatest war potential of Japan. It was they'
who made possible all .Japan's conquests and aggressions. . Not'
only were the ~ a i b a t as
s ~ responsible for Japan's militarism as the
militarists thkselves, but they ,profited immensely from it. Euen
-,'in
&fear, they have mtdZy strengthened $heir mmopdy paziiim [italics mine].. : As long as the Zaibatsu survive, Jap
be their Jd~an.''~l
On paper, the U.S. Occupation f'broke upy"the Zaibatsu h
early in the postwar period. A top1 of 325 Japanese firms were
originally slated for '~stmcturdreorganization"-i.e,
breaking up of
kondpolies. But in r 948 the Draper-Johnston mission visited Japan,
ostensibly to determine how much in the way of war damage reparations Japan could afford to part with. Major-General Draper, as it
happened, had hen largely responsible for the decision to halt the
'
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decartelization of German industry and restore its potential. Percy
Johnston was Chairman of the Chemical -Bank & Trust Co. As a
direct,result of their mission, Occupation officials announced (in May,
1948) that 194 of the 325 Japanese firms would be excused from
"reorganization." Later in the year still more firms were excused.=
The same ominous pattern shows itself in the "purge" from
public activity of the men held responsible for Japanese aggression.
Of ;95,273 Japanese war lords, militarists and government officials
"purged" by the U.S. Occupation in the first flush of .democratic
reform, over 177,000 had already-by I gsx-been depurged by order
of former Occupation authorities and the Yoshida governmentb3
It would be unRelease was promised to the remaining .IS-.
realistic to expect that a few years of "retirement" could change
the motivatibns of these power-hungry men. Their' careers have em
bodied all the poisonous traditions of Japanese feidalisp and mili
tarism. "In addition to retbrning to public life such prominent per.
sons as ex-Finance Minister Ishibashi, former Police Chid Tanakawa, the former President of the Liberal Party, Ichiro Hatoyama
and important members of the old Zaibatsu, the Yoshida government
has 'depurged' former officers and directors of thc imperial Rule.
Assistance Association and its amiated Youth Association. .
More than 1,326 p q o n s purged because of their connections with the
'thought police' have already been cleared.""
American officials and the reactionary Japanese government have
worked hand in glovp to rcIease this poison once more into the
national bloodstream of Japan. With the "purgees" back on the
scene, it might be said that there is only one new character in the
Japanese drama: the American big businessman, who has moved in
on the Japanese big. businessman to control him and to share with him
in the profits from Japan's lopsided boom.
During the American occupation of Japan .over $3.5 billionrepresenting 75 per cent of all capital invested-was invest4 by
American big business in Japanese industry. The names of these
investors loom large among America's m "Zaibatsu." In 1950
Du Pant, Ford, and westinghouse- International invested $600
million in Japanese industry. Standard Vacuum Oil Co. now controls 51 per cent of the stock of the East Asiatic Fuel Co. of Japan.
Reynolds Metals (aluminum) has captured half the stock in the

..
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Japan Light Metals Co. International Standard Electric controls
the Japanese Electric Co, and Surnitomo Electric, while Westinghouse is firmly entrenched in the Mitsubishi Electric Co. General. .
Electric dominates the giant Shibaura' Electric Co. American Lead
Manufacturing has acquired control of the Nippon Chemical Works.
Dillon, Read controls the Japanese textile industry.
Remembering this tremendous investment and the specific investors, the alignment of opposing political and economic forces in
Japan today becomes vividly clear. Arrayed against the vital interests of the Japanese workers and small businessmen stand the
Japanese and American industrial overlords. From this industrial
oligarchy, reactionary Japanese politicians like Yoshida draw their
inspiration and their power. Thanks to the intervention of American bkinessmen, ' ~ a ~ a n e sheavy
e
industry was never forced to pay
back to victimized Asian nations more than a tiny fraction of the
war damages incurred on behalf of the Zaibatsu. Thanks to the
intervention of the same American interests, General MacArthur
and his Occupation forces promptly proceeded to undo in practice
all the economic reforms proposed by the democratic nations which
had just defeated the forces of fascism.
Out of the community of interests between the Zaibatsu and Wall
Street have come the drive for rearmament' and the drive for
strengthened monopoly. Into that community has been sucked the
harvest of Japanese production, leaving the Japanese working people
high and dry. But the hard new factor for big businessmen and
diplomats of both countries-the significant factor that must be
taken into account by American citizens-is the community of in- ,
terest between the smaller businessmen of Japan and the active,
revitalized masses of Japanese workers.

"We want neither to Zead or nmiserable ZiPe any
Zonger, nor to be dragged into another roar."
These words are being repeated in Japan today in - a thousand
forms; carried on posters; echoed in unanimous resolutions by large
union organizations, women's groups, peasant groups, and small
business associations; they are sounding even in the popular books
and movies of Japan. Repressive legislation and the activities of the

%

Japanese police testify t o the fact that the Zaibatsu-Wall Street all;ance is having nightmares.
In sum, the most reactionary elements of Japanese and American
power have laid out a path for Japan's future:
Ever-increasing military spending, to be compensated by cuts in
government payrolls, in social security and unemployment
funds;
Continued emphasis on war manufactures, and increased control
by American and Japanese monopoly, regardless of the da,mage
done to the rest of the economy;
Maintenance in power and influence of those corrupt, traditionrooted politicians and militarists whose type was rampant in prewar Japan;
Continuing depression of the Japanese standard of living; and
Intensdying suppression of all popular protest against this course.

.

'

' The' path is laid out, but the Japanese government is having to
walk very slowly indeed. Yoshida and his friends have long since
realized what American citizens must quickly learn-that the Japanese "common man" is fighting tooth and nail, in increasing numbers, against a path that can have only war and starvation at the
end of it.
It must become evident to widening circles of American citizens
that the money we are spending in Japan for armament and "mutual
security" is a liability rather than an investment. Our money is not
contributing to t h e basic welfare of the whole Japanese people but
to the profit of a few. This method of winning allies has failed in the
past. The pattern bears an unmistakable resemblance .to other U.S.
efforts in the Far East which have resulted in the blunders, catastrophes and defeats of U.S.foreign policy in Asia and has made our
country an object of suspicion and hostility in that part of the world.
Our own best interest surely lies in a Japan that is economically
healthy and capable of a peaceful existence among its Asian neighbors
and in the world. This means rejecting the kind of American foreign
policy which is now supporting Japan's munitions makers and "reformed" imperialists. It means giving Japan the real independence
she needs in order to work o i t her tremendous problems.
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